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Abstract 
The armed conflict that has erupted in Ukraine in 2014 has been affecting the way the states 
involved interact and how they seek to implement certain narratives in a new regional political 
context. While Russia has taken a more assertive stance in its neighbourhood through a 
narrative that seeks to contradict Western values promoted by the European Union (EU), the 
latter has shown some difficulty in presenting a coherent narrative in the face of developments 
over the past five years. 
In this sense, this article proposes to analyse the EU-Russia interaction, using as a case study 
the incident involving the crash of the Malaysia Airlines civil aircraft MH17. The analytical 
perspective combines elements of Role Theory - which here focuses on the interaction of 
states on the basis of certain expectations regarding their internal (national) and external 
(regional/international) roles - and Strategic Narratives. The differences between issue 
narratives (including regarding the Bellingcat Investigation Team narrative), system 
narratives and identity narratives are explored. The argument presented here is that the 
externalization of the EU issue narrative has emerged in two distinct ways - one more 
moderate in its official stance as an institution; another more assertive from the point of view 
of the work done by the East Stratcom Task Force (EATF). This ends up creating some 
dissonance in the way the European Union designs its narrative, and misalignment with the 
EU's narrative identity as a role state. 
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Introduction 
The armed conflict in Ukraine in the Donbass region gained renewed momentum with the 
crash of the Malaysia Airlines plane on the route between Amsterdam and Kuala Lumpur 
on 17 July 2014 as it flew over the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine. The death of almost 
300 people, the vast majority European, has led EU countries to take a more assertive 
joint stance in seeking a resolution of the armed conflict in that region. The EU's stance 
stood out for greater unity, paving the way for broader sanctions against Russia, 
targeting key sectors of the Russian economy, including the financial, arms and energy 
sectors. However, the Minsk Protocol signed in September 2014 under the auspices of 
the OSCE failed to achieve the ceasefire proposed in the document. The same happened 
with Minsk II, signed by the Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in February 2015, 
which unsuccessfully sought to resolve the shortcomings of the first agreement. 
Petro Poroshenko, who in 2014 became the new President of Ukraine, since the beginning 
was determined to regain institutional ties with the EU, while Russia has sought to 
implement new ways of destabilizing the country and fostering its own narrative about 
the events in Ukraine. His successor, Volodymyr Zelensky, elected in 2019, is in the same 
position and has the same aspirations. Thus, having at its doorstep a conflict which, 
according to the UN, has already led to the deaths of 13,000 people, of whom over 3,000 
civilians (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019) means 
that the EU's foreign policy has come under heavy media pressure in recent years, which 
further increases its responsibility in this process. 
Through the analysis of various secondary and primary sources, this paper aims to 
analyse the evolution of the narratives of Russia and the EU in relation to the fall of the 
MH17, which serves as the main case study in this context. 
  
                                                     
1  The translation of this article was co-funded by Instituto Camões in the framework of the 1st International 
Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies. Text translated by Carolina Peralta. 
2  Special issue of articles presented at the 1st International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace 
Studies that took place at UAL on the 29th and 30th of November 2018. 
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Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this article will be based on the concept of Role Theory. 
Developed in the field of sociology and psychology, this theoretical framework has been 
adapted to international relations since the 1970s (Harnisch, 2011, p.7; see Walker 
1987). The roles played by certain actors are defined as “social positions” influenced by 
internal and external expectations regarding their purpose (Thies, 2010b, p. 6336; 
Andrews, 1975, p. 529; quoted in Harnisch, 2011, p.8). 
According to Sebastian Harnisch, role expectations and role conceptions arise internally 
(ego) and externally (alter), and can be challenged, as the role of a particular actor can 
collide with that of another. According to Stephan Klose (2018, p. 6), for example, “the 
ability of an international actor to fulfil his or her representative aspirations in society 
depends as much on his/her creativity and resources as on the social expectations of 
others”. 
In this sense, post-Soviet states have different perceptions of the EU's role in the region, 
and only a few see the institution as a normative power (Nitoiu, 2018, p. 704). This brief 
explanation is relevant in the context of this article, as the perception and expectations 
of the EU's role as an international actor are not uniform, within the EU or outside the 
institution - notably in Russia, with whom it often collides, as the conflict in Ukraine 
exemplifies (Ademmer et al., 2016; Chaban and Holland, 2014; Delcour and Wolczuk, 
2018; Lucarelli, 2014). 
Dirk Nabers (2011, p. 82) presents two distinct ways in which the roles played by 
different actors relate to their identities. On the one hand, the role of a particular actor 
represents the limit of his actions, which in turn defines his identity. On the other hand, 
the actor's representation can also be influenced by his identity, and the former can serve 
as a reference or framework for the latter (Nabers, 2011, p. 83). This is important in the 
context of the EU, particularly in the case of the conflict in Ukraine, due to what several 
authors identify as an imbalance between what is perceived as “European identity” and 
what is done in foreign policy matters. 
In addition to the support provided by Role Theory as a theoretical approach, this paper 
will also use Strategic Narratives, a concept developed by Alister Miskimmon, Ben 
O'Loughlin and Laura Roselle (2013). This choice is because it allows us to better 
understand how communication (political and not only) affects relations between states, 
something that may also help to understand whether this narrative fits in with the identity 
and role of the EU. 
The armed conflict in Ukraine is particularly highlighted by the confrontation of interests, 
discourses and identities between the actors involved, whether they stand closer to the 
EU narrative or to the Russian narrative. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how 
these dynamics evolve and affect the actors involved, especially at a time when Russia 
seeks to assert itself as a true global actor, and in a context where the EU suffers the 
consequences of migration-related problems, Brexit or the US administration led by 
Donald Trump. 
 
EU - Ukraine - Russia - An Imperfect Triangle 
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The armed conflict in Ukraine has attracted academic attention in recent years as it has 
become a stage for combat, not only in military terms but above all in political 
communication. However, empirical applications of the Strategic Narratives concept in 
this context are not often found. Moreover, the work that has been developed focuses 
mainly on the impact of the Russian narrative, as exemplified by the contributions of 
Joanna Szostek (2017; 2018) or Irina Khaldarova (2016). It is, therefore, important to 
understand how this dynamic has been built on the EU side, and what influence it has 
had on consolidating the role of the organization as an international actor. 
Some authors defend that the EU behaved like any other actor under the circumstances, 
and noted that the reaction was quick on several levels (Karolewski and Cross, 2017, 
p.138). Michal Natorski and Karolina Pomorska (2017, p.66) also agree with this idea, 
saying that the armed conflict in Ukraine has even led to increased confidence among EU 
members in the face of growing discomfort in relations with Russia. The cleavage between 
the EU and Russia is, moreover, one of the most important aspects of this conflict because 
of the consequences it has not only for Ukraine but also for the first two. Regarding this 
difference, Svante Cornell argues as follows: 
 
 “(…) the Russian sphere of influence is incompatible not only with 
the form of European integration envisaged by the EaP, but at a 
more fundamental level with the type of countries that the EU’s 
instruments would help to create. Where European leaders want a 
stable neighbourhood, Russia seeks an unstable one; where Europe 
seeks to develop accountability, Russia undermines it. Thus, the 
competition between Russia and Europe is not only geopolitical; it is 
fundamentally ideological.” (Cornell, 2014, p.119) 
 
Allister Miskimmon (2017, p.164) states that the incongruity of the EU narrative in 
relation to Ukraine has affected the institution's international credibility and hampered 
the process of affirmation as an international actor in foreign policy. Although the 
argument does not refer directly to the MH17 issue, it demonstrates the EU's difficulty in 
creating a narrative that can be receptive not only to the Ukrainian community, but also 
within the institution; Ukraine thus represents “a test for its identity narrative as a 
regional peacemaker and defender of universal values” (Miskimmon (2017, p.161). 
The idea that the EU has played a limited role in the face of the Ukrainian conflict is 
supported by other authors. Taras Kuzio, for example, presents three factors to support 
this argument: the inability to exert an assertive influence on internal reforms in Ukraine, 
given the lack of a prospect of integration of the country into the EU; the difficulty in 
understanding the motivations of Ukrainian elites; and the difficulty in understanding 
Russia's foreign policy dynamics in thinking that enlargement to eastern countries would 
have no repercussions (Kuzio, 2017, pp.116-117). 
The difficulties experienced in dealing with the Ukraine stem in part from a relationship 
with various ups and downs over the last two decades. This link between the two parties 
is described as an “ambiguous partnership, founded on a complex legal and institutional 
design” (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2014, p.12). Apart from this institutional difficulty, 
Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU has also been affected by internal problems such 
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as corruption or lack of stable democratic institutions. Indeed, “the willingness of the 
elites to exploit energy dependence for their own benefit” is seen as one of the main 
reasons for the high Ukrainian dependency vis-à-vis Russia (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 
2016, p.694). This makes “the obstacles that Ukraine faces on its 'path to Europe' 
formidable” (Wolczuk, 2017, p.287). The same author, in another article, highlights the 
irony that, “after decades of marginalization, Ukraine has become crucial to debates 
about the future of Europe” (Wolczuk, 2016, p.70). 
This somewhat tumultuous relationship is exacerbated, as it turns out, by Russia's 
growing detachment from the EU, and vice versa. Relations within this triangle, at least 
until the beginning of the conflict, are described by Vsevolod Samokhvalov (2015, 
p.1372) as “a more or less homogeneous complex of zero-sum dynamics”. The author 
lists four key arguments in the development of this process, which  should be noted 
carefully: firstly, each of the actors (EU and Russia) seeks to introduce into Ukraine 
political practices in line with their own values and interests; secondly, at economic level, 
each actor has sought to open the Ukrainian market to its own markets in order to create 
a transnational dynamic; thirdly, both sides have sought to lure Ukraine into their security 
projects in the region, a scenario in which NATO also appears as a central actor; finally, 
each side has attempted to introduce an ideology and perception of history closer to its 
interests (Samokhvalov, 2015, pp.1372-1373). 
All this leads to the belief that the EU has indeed had several difficulties in assuming a 
coherent role vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, the role it plays is not always 
viewed positively (by other actors). According to Bengtsson and Elgstrom (2011, p.129), 
this is a consequence of inconsistent performance and contradictory elements in the 
development - and the current result - of European integration. 
 
Strategic Narratives in the Context of Armed Conflict in Ukraine 
Given the scenario described above, it is important to explore more carefully the Strategic 
Narratives concept. According to Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, they are 
"representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through 
which political actors - usually elites - try to attribute a particular meaning to the past, 
present and future in order achieve political goals” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.5). 
The focus on these narratives as vehicles for the transmission of ideas or identities is 
important because it allows “to connect the space between the concepts of hard and soft 
power” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.75), because the narrative of a particular actor may, for 
example, include the use of military resources, so the study of communication and 
narratives makes it possible to bridge the gap between these two concepts and to realize 
that boundaries are not always easily discernible. 
An important aspect of Strategic Narratives, especially in the context of the work 
conducted here, is its division into three distinct forms: issue narratives; identity 
narratives; and system narratives (Miskimmon, 2017, p. 155). In the case of the first, 
the author explains that they refer to how a particular narrative suits a policy, particular 
action or event. Identity narratives are related to the identity that a given actor attributes 
to himself, and that ends up influencing his narrative and how to act in the international 
arena. Finally, system narratives refer to how these same actors view the modern 
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international system, which in turn influences the way narratives are created and 
projected. 
Some authors use the Strategic Narratives concept as part of an analysis of the spread 
of fake news during the armed conflict in Ukraine (Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016).  The 
authors conclude that fabricated news and reports are part of a pre-established strategy 
to “elicit an affection response from the public” (Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016, p.899). 
This means that strategic narratives can, in certain contexts, take on a destabilizing role, 
as has been seen in relation to Russia's position in the conflict with Ukraine. 
One of the main catalysts of this informative “anarchy” characteristic of modern conflicts 
was the emergence of new communicative tools, namely social media. One of the great 
innovations of this technology was that it “provides users with the ability to search for 
information and share their own content within their own networks” (Zeitzoff, 2017, 
p.1972). This ultimately creates a more chaotic environment where information can be 
reproduced and shared by anyone with access to these tools, thus increasing the 
possibility of fake news spreading - extremely common in the context of the MH17 
incident, as we will see later. In the case of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, this 
can be seen as a case where the Internet has increased the power of the actors involved 
to produce disinformation (Mejias and Vokuev, 2017, p.1027). 
This new communicative environment is often described as the post-truth regime, that 
is, a world in which facts are less important in shaping public opinion than appeals to 
personal emotions and beliefs. This aspect becomes increasingly important considering 
that the identity of populations is a central factor in the perception of certain narratives. 
In the case of Ukraine, for example, Joanna Szostek (2018, p.129) states that "it should 
not be surprising that people negotiate the meaning of news with reference to their values 
and experiences". This idea is present in another article by the same author: 
 
 “A state may spend any amount of money on disseminating 
messages about itself and the world, but the results will ultimately 
still hinge on factors that are largely beyond its control – including 
the attributes of (multiple, diverse) receiving audiences and the 
discursive context.” (Szostek, 2017: p.380).  
 
If narratives are produced by actors in order to achieve certain goals, those same 
narratives are susceptible to manipulation by the actors involved. In this sense, it is 
important to frame the concept of disinformation. This can be understood as 
“intentional lies spread as simulated news or documentary formats to achieve political 
ends” (Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p.124). The ease with which this type of 
malicious information circulates among the various media makes it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish the true information from the one that merely intends to lie or 
mislead. 
Some authors place the responsibility of this process in the strengthening of social 
networks as a vehicle of communication (Hannan, 2018). This makes it critical to 
analyse the evolution of this procedure on social networks, where the spread of fake 
news is considerably easier and more effective. 
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In the case of Ukraine and the conflict that started in 2014, one of the existing 
arguments is that “the use of social media has weakened the power of civil society by 
allowing the rampant diffusion of disinformation” (Mejias and Vokuev, 2017, p. 
.1028). Associated with what is considered to be a “breach of trust in democratic 
press and political institutions” (Bennett and Livingston, 2018, p.127), the sheer 
amount of information sources in today's communication landscape makes 
disinformation an increasingly viable tool. Let us look at the words of Bennett and 
Livingston for an idea of this context: 
 
 “Compared to the mass media era, the current age displays a 
kaleidoscopic mediascape of television networks, newspapers and 
magazines (both online and print), YouTube, WikiLeak, and LiveLeak 
content, Astroturf think tanks, radical websites spreading 
disinformation using journalistic formats, Twitter and Facebook 
among other social media, troll factories, bots, and 4chan discussion 
threads, among others.” (Bennett e Livingston, 2018, p.129) 
 
This helps to create a more chaotic information environment, a kind of “far-west 
communication” (Hannan, 2018, p.11). In turn, this factor increases the possibility of 
“information wars”, as has been the case in Ukraine, where different positions seek 
to dilute the importance of the adversary's narrative. In one of her studies of the 
Ukrainian population, Joanna Szostek demonstrates how most people who 
participated in the study looked at the general media with a high level of distrust 
(Szostek, 2018, p.124). 
This type of hybrid combat methods (using not only traditional military means but 
also information warfare systems) has been a major concern for the EU, especially 
given Russia's recent external action (Wagnsson and Hellman, 2018). These authors 
propose a normative stance that favours support to secondary actors who can 
challenge attitudes they identify as incorrect, without seeking to ridicule “the other” 
(Wagnsson and Hellman, 2018, p.12). This difficulty within the EU to find a proper 
stance towards what is generally understood as Russia's escalation in hybrid warfare 
demonstrates the importance of using the concept of Strategic Narratives. By 
understanding how this process is assembled and propagated, it will be easier in the 
future to find ways to deal with it. 
On the other hand, the literature on this subject has focused, as previously 
mentioned, on the impact of Russian narratives during the armed conflict in Ukraine 
(Khaldarova and Pantii, 2016; Mejias and Vokuev, 2017; Szostek, 2017; Szostek, 
2018). One of the shortcomings this article intends to fill is precisely to explain the 
EU's role in this process, and to understand how the European narrative has evolved 
over the last few years. 
 
MH-17 and the Clash of Narratives 
The crash of the MH17 plane in July 2014 was a pivotal moment with regard to the 
evolution of the narratives of the actors involved regarding the conflict in Ukraine. On 
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the one hand, the EU has had the opportunity to strengthen its role as a relevant player 
on the ground, as two of its members (the Netherlands and Belgium) have been directly 
affected, and have been involved in the Joint Investigation Team (JIT)3, the team 
responsible for analysing the MH17 case. On the other hand, Russia has sought to use 
the incident as evidence that the West continues to push the country away from the 
centre of decisions, in particular because of its refusal to participate in the JIT (see Table 
1). However, Russia's stance was not oriented towards cooperation; instead, a context 
has been created in which the JIT has been constantly confronted with new versions of 
the events leading up to the MH17 tragedy. In this section, we look at some important 
turning points in the development of the MH17-related process. 
On 18 July 2014, a day after the MH17 crash, Ukrainian authorities revealed several 
tapes of conversations between Ukrainian separatists and Russian military officials about 
the crash (BBC, 2014). Although it was not possible to confirm their veracity, the 
suspicions raised from the first hour centred Russia's participation in the crash of the 
aircraft. This prompted a rapid reaction from the Russian government, which immediately 
took an accusatory stance on Ukraine's role in the case. In an official statement made on 
the same day, the Russian Ministry of Defence asserted that Russian air defence systems 
did not operate in that area on the day of the crash, implying that there would be 
Ukrainian forces with access to equal air defence units in the region, the same as those 
used to shoot down the plane, the BUK-TELAR (Russian Ministry of Defence, 2014). 
On 21 July, the same ministry held a press conference where it directly accused Ukraine 
of the disaster, notably through a model Su-25 Ukrainian fighter plane, allegedly sighted 
near the MH17 before the crash. According to the Bellingcat group, all hypotheses raised 
by Moscow "have been refuted by multiple sources, sometimes even by the evidence 
provided by the Russian government itself" (Toler, 2018). For several months after the 
disaster, the Russian narrative of events alternated mainly between these two versions: 
on the one hand, that the plane had been shot down by a Ukrainian army-controlled BUK 
system; On the other hand, the theory that it was a Ukrainian fighter plane to cause the 
fall of the MH17. 
As early as June 2015, an analysis by Russian state-owned armament company Almaz-
Antey claimed that the 9M38M1 missile, used to shoot down the MH17, had not been 
used by Russian forces since 1999 (Russia Today, 2015). This information came in line 
with the theory that the missile was operated by Ukrainian forces without Russian military 
personnel being involved in the process. Once again, the Bellingcat research group 
contested this information, bringing together a set of images showing how the Russian 
military continued to use the same type of missile (Higgins, 2015). In October of the 
same year, the Dutch Safety Board's (DSB)4 final report concluded that the MH17 was 
indeed shot down by a Russian-made BUK system, even though it had no definitive 
conclusions as to who was responsible for shooting it (Dutch Safety Board, 2015). These 
results, though not definitive, again put the Russian government under fire. Once again, 
the Moscow narrative was one of denial, trying to convey the message that the West was 
trying to incriminate Russia without sufficient evidence (see Table 1). 
                                                     
3  The Joint Investigation Team was created after the fall of the MH17 in August 2014 to lead the criminal 
investigation of the case. The group is made up of police and judicial forces from the Netherlands, Ukraine, 
Belgium, Malaysia and Australia.   
4  The Dutch Safety Board was invited to participate in the MH17 criminal investigation by the National Bureau 
of Air Accidents Investigation of Ukraine.  
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In this context, the years following the incident were marked by a narrative battle in 
which the results raised by the DSB or JIT were quickly refuted by Russian officials, who 
sought to feed various theories about the plane crash, particularly the two referred to 
above. In September 2016, for example, the Russian Ministry of Defence presented radar 
images showing the alleged presence of Ukrainian air defence systems in the region 
where the MH17 had crashed, but without reference to the presence of Ukrainian military 
aircraft near the MH17, in contradiction to what had been said two years earlier at the 
press conference on 21 July 2014 (Higgins, 2016). 
It appears, therefore, that Russia's attitude throughout the process has varied, 
demonstrating a serious inconsistency in its issue narrative dimension - notably as 
regards its concern with the issue of the BUK missile that shot down the MH17 and the 
details that involved its production process and transportation to Ukrainian territory. 
Moreover, in the identity narrative dimension, we can frame the Russian stance, in the 
context of Role Theory, as an ego state - especially in the context of its contesting stance 
on the work of the JIT, the attribution of responsibility to Ukraine, and the criticism of 
the EU as well as of the West for unconditional support for Ukraine (Telegraph 2014, see 
Table 1). 
Although the case has lost some media attention since then, the May 2018 JIT report has 
once again focused attention on Russia's alleged role. Let us look at one of the main 
conclusions: 
 
 “Today, the JIT has concluded that the BUK-TELAR which was used 
to shoot down flight MH17 originated from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft 
Missile Brigade of the Russian armed forces. This observation raises 
questions, such as the question whether the Brigade itself was 
actively involved in the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. An 
important question, which the JIT is still investigating.” (Joint 
Investigation Team, 2018) 
 
According to the argument put forward, the Russian military would have been directly 
involved in transporting the system used to shoot down the MH17, a narrative 
corroborated by the Bellingcat team. The Russian narrative, on the other hand, remains 
to be one of denial of any involvement in the case, reinforcing (recently) the accusatory 
stance towards Ukraine. In September 2018, the Russian army announced that the 
missile used to shoot down MH17 belonged to the Ukrainian military, having left Russian 
territory in 1986 (Vasilyeva, 2018). 
On 19 June 2019, the JIT announced that criminal proceedings will be initiated in the 
Netherlands against four persons responsible for the MH17 flight tragedy. 
 
The East Stratcom Task Force and the EU’s Response 
The traditional EU’s difficulty to act with one voice towards Ukraine has increased in 
recent years by the growing campaigns of discrediting and disinformation promoted 
largely in the context of conflict by Russian-influenced media or the Kremlin itself. This 
is particularly relevant given the EU's inability to prevent its members from sometimes 
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having different or even contradictory positions (Karolewski and Cross, 2017, p. 148). 
Nevertheless, the fall of the MH17 initially boosted the EU's stance towards Russia, 
particularly through the tightening of sanctions imposed on Moscow and the 
assertiveness of some previously reluctant actors to harass Russia, with particular 
emphasis on the case of Germany. This change, brought about by the deaths of European 
citizens, has allowed the EU to attribute itself its own narrative as a prominent actor in 
the region, whose role is central to the resolution of the conflict, assuming its position as 
role state in the face of Russian involvement. The EU's strategic narrative stands out for 
its recognition that Russia is involved in the armed conflict in Ukraine, and calls on Russia 
to assume its responsibility for the MH17 tragedy (e.g. High Representative, 2018, 2019). 
However, particularly at the outset, the EU sought to move away from the 'narrative war' 
on the course of events leading to the fall of the MH17, without following the changes in 
the Russian narrative, or to highlight the serious inconsistency of this narrative in its 
official discourse. Eventually, this made the Russian strategic narrative maintain its 
projection, which was further reinforced by the surprising position of Mahathir Mohamad, 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, who in June 2019, contrary to the previous government's 
position, challenged the JIT conclusions by stating that the latter had no evidence of 
Russian involvement in the tragedy. 
The EU’s stance - which focused on supporting the work of the EIC/JIT, considered 
'essential' and conducted 'with independence, professionalism and impartiality' (High 
Representative, 2018) - went no further than this, ultimately weakening the issue 
narrative dimension of the EU’s strategic narrative, creating a misalignment with its 
narrative identity of an actor invested in the promotion and defence of human rights, 
values, and able to contribute to the resolution of an armed conflict, in line with the 
action of a role state (see Table 1). 
The main way the EU found to counter Russian disinformation campaigns was the 
establishment in 2015 of the East Stratcom Task Force (ESTF), a team to monitor and 
document disinformation narratives that are somehow linked to Russia or related media 
groups operating in the Eastern European region. In its conclusions of March 2015, the 
European Council reiterated the “need to address continuing Russian disinformation 
campaigns” (European Council, 2015), which led to the writing of an Action Plan 
presented in June of that year. The importance the EU attaches to the ESTF is appreciated 
by its assessment of the systematization of 4500 cases of Russian disinformation by the 
Council in 2018 and the tripling of the ESTF budget in 2019 compared to that in 2018 
(EEAS 2018). However, the ESTF position “cannot be considered the official position of 
the EU” (EEAS 2018). 
Through a weekly publication entitled Disinformation Review and its EUvsDisinfo website, 
the ESTF seeks to analyse fake or biased news in favour of the Kremlin's official position. 
Unlike the EU, the ESTF takes a much more critical stance on Russia's role in the armed 
conflict in Ukraine. In the case of the MH17, the work conducted resulted in the 
publication of several articles that generally point to Russia as responsible for covering 
up the true cause and those responsible for the crash of the plane, with 'nine waves' of 
Russian disinformation directed at the MH17 case to be listed in one of the analysed 
examples (EUvsDisinfo 2017). 
In another article on the subject, the team argues that “the Russian authorities have 
been conducting, together with the media, a disinformation campaign that they directly 
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and indirectly control in order to cover up the truth about who shot down the MH17 flight 
of the Malaysian Airlines in Eastern Ukraine” (EUvsDisinfo, 2018). A more recent article 
presents a chronological analysis of what is defined as “five years of pro-Kremlin 
disinformation campaigns” (EuvsDisinfo2019). This shows that the ESTF sees Russia not 
only as an “enemy” of MH17 research, but also as an obstacle to the EU's own values. 
If we compare this position with that of a certain official withdrawal from the EU regarding 
these disinformation campaigns, we find that there is a dissonance in the EU's strategic 
narrative, with a more thoughtful position and seeking to maintain an open line of 
dialogue with Russia; and another more assertive, which clearly identifies Russia as an 
antagonistic actor - the position of the ESTF. The latter better aligns the EU issue 
narrative and identity narrative as a normative actor in line with a role state, but is not 
accepted as an official EU strategic narrative. 
 
Conclusions 
The armed conflict that started in Ukraine in 2014 has proved to be a difficult obstacle 
for the EU in terms of foreign policy and international projection. The MH17 flight tragedy 
serves as the clearest example of this conflict as a combat stage, not only in military 
terms, but above all in political communication. 
In the case of Russia, the response to the incident has ranged from a focus on issue 
narrative - notably as regards its concern with the issue of the BUK missile that shot 
down the MH17 and the details that involved its production process and transport to 
Ukrainian territory; and on a narrative identity that we can frame, in the context of the 
Role Theory, as an ego state - especially in the context of its stance on the JIT's work. 
The narrative dimensions presented turn out to be inconsistent and misaligned, but 
ultimately create a serious challenge for the projection of the EU's own narrative, which 
initially sought to move away from this war of narratives. 
 
Table 1. Russian and EU strategic narratives regarding the MH 17: identity, system, issue  
 Identity System Issue (MH17) 
Russia - Narrative of an ego state 
- Western attempts to 
represent Russia as 'guilty' 
and 'enemy' - exclusion of 
Russia by the West/EU and 
non-acceptance of Russia 
as a Global Actor; 
- Confrontation between 
Russia and the West in 
Europe 
- EU / West should 
accept Russia as ego 
state for the sake of 
regional stability  
 
- Responsibility for the 
tragedy: Ukrainian; 
- Criticism of unconditional 
Western support for Ukraine, 
both regarding MH17 and 
armed conflict 
 
EU - Narrative of a role state 
- Actor aspiring to find 
solution to regional 
conflicts 
- Governance based on the 
principles of democracy and 
human rights The power of 
the EU example (despite 
Brexit) 
-  Principles of 
Democracy and 
Human Rights 
- Principled pragmatism  
- Responsibility for the 
tragedy: Russian, must be 
assumed by Russia 
- Russia's involvement in the 
armed conflict in Ukraine: 
Russia as a Problem and not 
as a Strategic Partner 
*** - STRATCOM: Russia as 
responsible actor for 
purposeful disinformation 
and challenging EU values  
Source: Table prepared by the authors, based on Miskimmon's contribution (2017). 
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Following the analysis presented here, we find that this withdrawal made it difficult to 
project a more assertive narrative, officially, a kind of "outsourcing" of the response to 
the Member States and the JIT taking place. The clearest answer comes as a result of 
the work of the ESTF and the “EU v. Disinfo”, although it is rarely incorporated into the 
EU’s position as an institution. The dissonance that results from this EU position 
ultimately weakens the issue narrative dimension of its strategic narrative, further 
creating incongruity with its narrative identity as an actor invested in the promotion and 
defence of human rights, values, and able to contribute to the peace in the region. We 
can conclude that the EU, while seeking to maintain its narrative identity as a role state 
in the region, has had difficulty fighting Russia's constant disinformation campaigns in 
the context of the fall of the MH17. 
The aspiration to maintain its narrative identity did not result in the institution projecting 
a consistent and strong enough narrative, but it served as a kind of “testing ground” for 
the projection of new disinformation campaigns. 
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